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EJPE’S NOTE: This interview was conducted by Thomas Wells, co-editor of the Erasmus 
Journal for Philosophy and Economics. 
 
Identity problems:  
an interview with John B. Davis 
 
JOHN B. DAVIS is professor of economics at Marquette University (USA) 
and professor of the history and philosophy of economics at the 
University of Amsterdam (Netherlands). He holds PhDs in both 
philosophy (1983, University of Illinois; under the supervision of 
Richard Schacht) and economics (1985, Michigan State University;   
under the supervision of John P. Henderson and Warren J. Samuels). 
He has published on many areas in the philosophy, history, ethics, 
and methodology of economics. His published monographs include 
Keynes’s philosophical development (Cambridge, 1994); The theory of the 
individual in economics (Routledge, 2003); and Individuals and identity in 
economics (Cambridge, 2011). He co-authored Economic methodology: 
understanding economics as a science (Palgrave, 2010) with Marcel 
Boumans. In addition to his research on identity and the theory of the 
individual, he has written extensively on recent changes in economics. 
He is a past president of the History of Economics Society (HES), the 
International Network for Economic Method (INEM), and the Association 
for Social Economics (ASE), and past vice-president of the European 
Society for the History of Economic Thought (ESHET). He is a past editor 
of the Review of Social Economy, and is currently co-editor with D. Wade 
Hands of the Journal of Economic Methodology. 
In this interview, Professor Davis discusses the evolution of his 
career and research interests as a philosopher-economist and gives     
his perspective on a number of important issues in the field. He argues 
that historians and methodologists of economics should be engaged     
in the practice of economics, and that historians should be more open 
to philosophical analysis of the content of economic ideas. He suggests 
that the history of recent economics is a particularly fruitful and 
important area for research exactly because it is an open-ended story 
that is very relevant to understanding the underlying concerns and 
concepts of contemporary economics. He discusses his engagement  
with heterodox economics schools, and their engagement with a rapidly 
changing mainstream economics. He argues that the theory of the 
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individual is “the central philosophical issue in economics” and 
discusses his extensive contributions to the issue. 
 
EJPE: Professor Davis, you are unusual in having PhDs in both 
philosophy and economics. Is there a story behind that? How do     
you manage your identities as philosopher and economist? 
 
JONH DAVIS: Like many people, much of the story of how I happened   
to do what I have done was the result of the chances of life. I began in 
philosophy at the University of Illinois after dismissing my adolescent 
assumption that I would be a lawyer, but found as I moved to complete 
the degree that the job market was very poor and that my prospects for 
teaching philosophy anywhere were not good. At the same time, though 
I came from a suburban Chicago solidly middle class Republican 
background, I was radicalized in the 1970s by the Vietnam War, and 
decided that philosophy was too ivory tower and that economics 
(whatever that was) mattered. So before I finished my philosophy thesis 
I started at the University of Michigan in economics. But my first micro 
course with Hal Varian, where solving problems was more important 
than interpreting them, quickly demonstrated to me that I had to get my 
comparative advantage straight. That turned out to be the connection 
between the history of philosophy (one of my fields at Illinois; ethics 
was the other) and the history of economics.  
Up the road was Michigan State University, where they then had four 
historians of economics and multiple courses in the field. Moving there, 
I was able to finish both degrees, finishing my philosophy dissertation 
while I was studying for my economics prelims. Youth has its 
advantages! That I was able to do both degrees, I think, was in good  
part due to the low cost of living and teaching assistant income then for 
graduate students at public universities (though mentors were also very 
important). One could survive, and even raise a family, while studying 
most of the time. That world, unfortunately, is now long gone, at least  
in the United States, where most people must indenture themselves to 
lenders to pursue advanced study. 
I have managed my two identities by following a particular career 
pathway. I do not specialize or publish in the professional philosophy 
literature but concentrate on the history and methodology of economics 
literature. Partly this has been strategic: it is difficult to write and        
be successful in publishing if one has to communicate with two rather 
disparate audiences at the same time, and even philosophers of 
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economics tend to look at issues quite differently from methodologists 
of economics. Partly it has been because I thought economics more 
important for what happens in the world. Still, this choice placed me in 
two small subfields in economics (history and methodology) which    
also do not communicate very well. Nonetheless, I have always thought 
the philosophical or methodological dimensions of the history of 
economics a fertile intellectual domain (as have others in the history    
of economics: Smith, Marx, Keynes, and Sen, for example). Whether    
this kind of strategy is workable in the future is hard to say. Without the 
current system of secure long-term employment in academia, which may 
be endangered, the forces for ‘homogenizing’ research that discourage 
interdisciplinary niche research may be too strong.  
Also on the subject of identities, I have taught in economics my 
whole career. This has meant I have learned to think like an economist, 
where one moves step by step in a fairly linear way, which is quite 
different from thinking like a philosopher, where rival foundational 
assumptions are always being juggled and traded-off against one 
another so that the whole explanatory picture can transmutate before 
one’s eyes with a small change in assumptions. 
I like both types of thinking, but there is something to be said for 
focusing on the explanatory task economists see themselves addressing 
for grasping the logic of economic thinking. Some philosophers and 
methodologists of economics, in my view, fail in this regard. They come 
forward with good philosophical arguments, but they do not quite get at 
what the issues are for economists. So I was opposed to the idea, floated 
a number of years ago in the history of thought community—and the 
subject of a 1992 History of Political Economy symposium responding   
to the ‘breaking away’ proposal of Margaret Schabas (1992)—that 
historians of economics ought to migrate away from economics to    
find homes in history and philosophy of science programs. Teaching 
economics and having economics colleagues is in my view important  
for properly understanding the philosophical and methodological issues 
in economics. 
 
I think you are also unusual in the range of areas you have published 
on, from the history and philosophy of economics to recent history   
of economics to heterodox economics (especially social economics) to 
identity. How do these link together, if they do? How have your 
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interests evolved? Would you recommend this approach to anyone 
else? 
 
I think there are more people than one might think who maintain 
multiple research programs, even in quite different subjects. Often there 
are links that one discovers in a natural way as one just happens on 
connections between things. But researchers can also have different 
interests without quite knowing how they connect. Or the connection is 
a somewhat path-dependent product of one’s history of interaction  
with other researchers (often at conferences, outside of sessions), whose 
work strikes one as interesting, and who suggest ideas and ask critical 
questions.  
Broadly speaking, the reason for my attachment to heterodox 
economics—aside from my politics—goes back to my philosophy 
training. Philosophy, with its attention to conceptual depth and          
the multiple interconnections between ideas, naturally invites one to  
ask whether tightly defined behavioral relationships, as in utility 
maximization analysis and competitive market theory, are not 
dependent on a host of underlying assumptions and ideas regarding 
institutions, norms, social values, and so on, that lie behind these 
behavioral relationships. So one (methodological) definition of 
heterodox economics—one not used by many it seems—is that it is an 
approach that insists on going beyond surface explanations to more 
holistic, in-depth explanations.  
Mainstream economics says this is unnecessary on the grounds that 
the more immediate analysis/model sufficiently communicates cause-
and-effect relationships. Heterodox economists reject that, and indeed 
argue that a tight logic can be wrong or misunderstood absent an 
appreciation of what the analysis/model more deeply presupposes.  
This makes the difference between mainstream and heterodox 
economics less a matter of content and politics and more a matter of 
different philosophies of science. I think the recent financial crisis 
demonstrates that the heterodox approach to science in terms of 
conceptual depth is better. But the surface model of science that 
dominates the mainstream is well-entrenched (perhaps reflective of the 
strong influence of American culture on science). This all ties in also to 
the mathematization of economics and the expulsion of narrative from 
scientific explanation, as associated with the recent decline of history  
of economics and economic history in economics departments. 
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My long involvement with social economics (particularly in eighteen 
years of editing the Review of Social Economy)—which led me to       
work on the individual and identity—derives from a combination          
of philosophical curiosity and a preference for a heterodox economics 
that emphasizes social values. My training in ethics and philosophy of 
science made it clear to me from early on that science is always value-
laden. When you see the world both in-depth and as pervaded by     
value you find you need to think of individuals as social and not 
atomistic. This all led me to what I saw as the central dilemma in the 
theory of the individual—how a person can be social and individual      
at the same time—which I tried to work out for myself by formulating 
two identity conditions for what individuals are which enable us to 
formulate social and relational conceptions of individuals.  
There was another important influence on my thinking about the 
individual in economics. When I first began working on the individual     
I could not get over the ideological character of the Homo economicus 
conception, i.e., that it was not just a benign tool of economic analysis 
but figured centrally in liberal society’s vision of itself and economics’ 
one-sided promotion of that vision. One of the things I learned from 
Warren Samuels was that economists commonly put themselves in 
service to ‘mythic devices’, as he put it. Thus for him an important task 
of methodological analysis in economics was to ferret out these 
attachments and expose them to fair analysis. In his late life work he 
performed a similar kind of analysis of the invisible hand, arguing in  
his Erasing the invisible hand (2011) that this idea central to economics 
is a largely ideological one that functions as a ‘psychic balm’ and means 
of social control. So I think Warren disposed me to looking critically 
beneath the so-called ‘scientific’ surface of economic ideas to the    
silent work they often perform. Indeed, the invisible hand and Homo 
economicus seem to occupy coordinate roles in this regard. 
Regarding moving back and forth across multiple personal research 
programs, I recommend this for a number of reasons. There is the 
practical matter of diversifying one’s credentials. I think it is also 
intellectually more satisfying, particularly over a long work life,            
to investigate many things. One should be open to where research takes 
you, since unanticipated subjects of investigation often drive one to 
develop new ideas, and one does not want to foreclose these 
possibilities at the cost of one’s research becoming repetitive and 
tedious. I was thus fortunate to teach for ten years at the University     
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of Amsterdam, since this gave me the opportunity to do something  
new, namely investigate new research programs in economics from an 
historical perspective—something which cannot be separated, I should 
add, from being able to work with the interesting and talented 
colleagues I had there.  
 
Moving to particular themes from your work. How would you describe 
your approach to the history of economic thought? 
 
The Amsterdam group in the History and Methodology of Economics 
(HME)—which was closed in early 2011 (more on this below)—argued 
that the history and methodology of economics are inseparable, a view 
not shared by that many historians and methodologists of economics, 
who tend to be fully specialized in one or the other field. Indeed some 
in the history of economics community do not hesitate to say that 
methodology/philosophy of economics type arguments have no place in 
history of economics journals, and for this reason submissions to 
history of economics journals that identify philosophical arguments     
in the history of economics are sometimes rejected without serious 
review.  
Why do many historians hold this separability view? I think the 
answer is connected to a change in recent years in the way the history  
of economics is done (something I think shows up when you compare 
contemporary historians with the generation who founded the History of 
Political Economy). The history of economics used to be practiced as the 
history of economic thought, where this was seen as the study of theory, 
ideas, and economic doctrine. In the reaction against this approach 
(beginning perhaps in the 1990s), historians of economics increasingly 
argued that their job was not to explicate and evaluate different 
doctrinal positions, but that it was their job to describe how economic 
views were developed by their proponents. Contributing to this view     
at the time were two developments: (1) History of Economics Society 
conferences in the 1980s and 1990s were often the site of contests 
between rival heterodox economists, and (2) many methodologists        
of economics adopted sociology of scientific knowledge views which 
described how economists/scientists behaved and happened to come 
about their views rather than what the rational content of those views 
might be. The first development generated professional concern that the 
history of economics was not a legitimate subfield—at a time when     
the economics profession was already skeptical about its value—while 
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the second development provided a model of scholarship which was 
neutral regarding the status of economic doctrine (if not also 
positivistic).  
The outcome of this was that by the end of the millennium 
historians had made archival work foundational to the practice of       
the field—something that was rarely done previously. ‘New’ evidence 
was not surprisingly a fairly solid route to publication (in a time when 
pressure to publish was being extended to historians of economics),  
and perhaps more respectable in the eyes of economists generally. And 
perhaps there were also diminishing returns by then in a fairly mature 
history of economics community to further doctrinal analysis. In any 
event, at least in my view, a kind of historiographic positivism became 
characteristic of much work in the history of economics, and this 
made—as a not entirely unintended consequence—methodological/ 
philosophical reasoning regarding the history of economics relatively 
unwelcome in the field.  
Of course it would be wrong to say that archival work (which I have 
done as well) is not valuable, just as it would be wrong to say that 
published materials are never sufficient for understanding the ideas     
in question. The immediate issue is rather the practice of excluding 
philosophical and methodological reasoning from the history of 
economics; the longer term issue is whether history of economics 
becomes impoverished when it avoids philosophical argument.  
I will not enter here into the general arguments in favor of the view 
(defended at Amsterdam) that history and methodology/philosophy of 
economics are inseparable—though I think they are compelling once one 
looks at the issue—but rather comment on why I personally hold this 
view. It comes from my being trained in philosophy prior to being 
trained in economics. Essentially I believe philosophical positions 
underlie all positions in economic theory and practice, and the view that 
the former (if acknowledged) can be bracketed off from the latter seems 
to me mistaken. This is not to say that one cannot focus on economics 
and its history without raising methodological and philosophical issues. 
Of course one can. Rather, one just does not get down to the key 
foundations for the views people have when one stops short of the deep 
conceptual commitments they assume (knowingly or not). So if many 
people prefer to stop short in this way, this seems to me to be a        
nice argument for having some people specialized in methodology and 
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philosophy of economics, as we have now. The latter just should not be 
excluded from the history journals.  
At Amsterdam, the HME group also emphasized (though not 
exclusively) the history of recent economics, namely the second half     
of the sixty year postwar period when, after 1980, new research 
programs began to appear in the field. We saw this as an important 
extension of the history of economics, both in time coverage and 
historiographically speaking. Regarding the latter point, an important 
difference about the recent history of economics is that the story 
remains significantly open, unlike the earlier history of economics, 
where historical episodes are largely complete in the sense that old 
ideas have been replaced by new ones in current practice. We used     
this difference at Amsterdam to argue that one needs economic 
methodology to understand unfinished histories, because it provides 
grounds for assessing the merits of research programs. This, it     
should be added, is a different historiographic procedure than usually 
employed with completed (albeit interpretively open) histories of 
economics, because there we tend to put aside their epistemic and 
ontological credentials, simply charting why some programs prospered 
and others did not. The fact that history goes one way or another          
is important, but the window that methodology/philosophy opens on 
history has its own analytical advantages that historians risk not 
appreciating.  
A corollary of this view is that practitioner economists in the current 
contested terrain of competing research programs in economics also 
think in methodological terms, albeit not in the professionalized 
language of economic methodologists and philosophers. Since history 
has yet to separate the winners from the losers, practitioners are not 
reluctant to defend their views in general methodological terms (as in 
the extensive debate over the merits and methods of experimentalism). 
An inadvertent consequence, then, of the de-emphasis of philosophy 
and methodology of economics in the history of economics is a general 
lack of interest in the recent history of economics. This, I suggest, may 
have two unfortunate effects on the history of economics as a field:       
it may make the field even more remote for economists generally; and it 
tends to leave historians of economics rather ignorant about the current 
changes in economic methods and theory. Imagine that in the not-so-
distant future economists look back and wonder about how economics 
evolved at the end of the twentieth century. As things stand now, they 
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are unlikely to receive much assistance from current historians of 
economics who by and large seem to be waiting until the story is fully 
over (though there are important exceptions). 
 
Is it fair to say that Keynes is a central figure for you? Why is that? 
 
Keynes was a central figure for me early in my career, seen as a 
philosopher-economist and as an inheritor of (a much revised) classical 
political economy devoted to understanding the economy as a whole.   
At least this was an assumption of my training in the history of 
economics at Michigan State University (under John P. Henderson,     
who wrote a comprehensive intellectual biography of David Ricardo—
the subject of my dissertation—and who was active for many years in 
the History of Economics Society).  
But that I worked on Keynes (rather than Ricardo) came by way of  
an accident. I was assigned at the 1987 Cambridge (MA) HES conference 
to discuss a paper by Suzanne Helburn on Keynes’s unpublished early 
Apostles papers, written under the influence of the philosopher G. E. 
Moore. I was surprised to find that I basically knew what those papers 
were about in virtue of my having studied Moore and the early twentieth 
century meta-ethics tradition in Anglo-American philosophy in my 
philosophy training. I also knew what the critiques were that had 
developed within philosophy regarding this tradition, and concluded 
that Keynes had lived long enough to have known what they were too. 
This meant to me that he had probably modified or abandoned many   
of his early views, including those from about the same time in his 
Treatise on probability (Keynes 1921)—whose underlying epistemology 
had also subsequently been soundly criticized by philosophers—
particularly as the philosophical assumptions in his later economics 
were so different. Since the standing view at the time the Apostles 
papers emerged was that Keynes’s later thinking about uncertainty 
flowed from the Treatise on probability, I believed the story had to       
be retold, which I did in my book Keynes’s philosophical development 
(Davis 1994), basically in order to rescue Keynes’s economic thinking 
from association with faulty philosophical positions I believed it could 
be shown he had rejected.  
Separately from all this, I also believed that Keynes was essentially 
correct in his diagnosis and analysis of mixed capitalist market 
economies, and that the post-Keynesian research program with its 
particular emphasis on finance and uncertainty is superior to more 
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standard contemporary macro reasoning. So my views as an economist 
interacted with my views as a philosopher and historian of economics. 
Though my economics PhD and first HOPE publication were on 
Ricardo, following Henderson’s lead and my original interest in classical 
political economy I was not much interested in the philosophical aspects 
of Ricardo’s work, and so this focus died. I guess he was not enough of  
a philosopher-economist to sustain my interest. In an indirect way, 
however, my work on Ricardo got rehabilitated in a number of papers    
I wrote on Piero Sraffa, who reintroduced Ricardo’s thinking as a 
rehabilitation of classical economics and a critique of neoclassical 
economics. In fact my experience was similar to what happened to me 
with Keynes. When I first worked on Sraffa’s 1926 Economic Journal 
paper criticizing Alfred Marshalls’s laws of returns analysis, I saw that 
the critique Sraffa was generally believed to have delivered against 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early Tractatus was entirely parallel to Sraffa’s 
critique of Marshall and neoclassical economics of about the same time 
(Davis 1988). So it was again clues from the history of philosophy      
that led my investigation and my writing in the history of economics.     
I subsequently wrote on a number of links between Sraffa, Keynes, and 
Wittgenstein (Davis 1996; 1998; 2002), assuming that their philosophical 
positions were what were ultimately at issue. Most recently I have a 
paper rethinking the Sraffa-Wittgenstein relationship based on new 
information from the Sraffa archive (and also from Wittgenstein’s 
letters) about Sraffa’s attachment to the anti-logical positivist 
physicalism view of early twentieth century philosophy of science 
(Davis, forthcoming). 
 
Many commentators and critics still talk about mainstream 
economics in terms of a single dominant (‘hegemonic’) neoclassical 
school, but you argue that this is actually out of date, e.g., in “The 
turn in recent economics and return of orthodoxy” (Davis 2008). 
 
My take on this, as I argued in the 2008 paper, comes from taking the 
long view on the history of economics. I think anyone who studies      
the history of economics must come to the conclusion that paradigms 
do not last forever, and new dominant paradigms are substantially 
different from old dominant ones. The idea that history does not    
really change things, or that there is some kind of eternal recurrence    
of mainstream theories, strikes me as being without any basis 
historically, though these kinds of views are popular in economics, 
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including among heterodox economists (most of whom are not 
historians of economics). Further, if we use (sociology of scientific 
knowledge) reflexivity reasoning that invites us to ask what drives our 
own behavior, we must note that our lifetimes are short, and if through 
much of our careers things have not changed much (the thirty years     
of the first half of postwar economics), it is natural for us to infer that 
there is no change in economics.  
Of course it is not hard to make such continuity arguments about 
postwar economics if one selects broad enough themes. To be fair, my 
own view that there is significant change in economics is also subject to 
criticism in terms of what I focus on. So I doubt this debate is going     
to be easily resolved (maybe not until more time has passed), and      
how it is waged will depend on how people understand the details.     
For example, no one denies that experimentalism is something new in 
economics (like econometrics was decades ago). So if things are still   
the same in economics today as circa 1970, one must show that the 
thousands of experiments that have been done over the last several 
decades only confirmed for the profession past theories and doctrines, 
and have not impacted mainstream economics in any significant way. 
Many economists, including mainstream economists, would dispute 
that. My impression, then, is that people making the argument that 
things are the same have not really looked at what is going on in 
experimentation in relation to standard theory (for example, in regard to 
ultimatum games and the public goods voluntary contribution game). 
According to Vernon Smith, who has a pretty good handle on the history 
of experimentation and is surely in the mainstream, standard theory, 
especially rational choice theory, has been largely shown not to            
be empirically supported (Smith 2010). Many experimentalists share   
his view. So how economics is changing, if it is, I think needs to be more 
carefully investigated. 
One of the problems for heterodox economists in this regard,            
I should add, is that since they often emphasize their differences from 
mainstream theory (which is reasonable given the latter’s dominance    
in economics), a changing mainstream makes for a moving target. This 
is reflected in the rise of behavioral economics: what we are to make of 
it for the overall development of economics is yet unclear, especially 
with rival behavioral views (the “old” Simon plus computation approach 
versus the “new” Kahneman-Tversky approach). Further, what is going 
on in the mainstream is very fine-grained, as for example in the 
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extensive debate about the nature of motivation (post the simple self-
interest hypothesis). So this means there is a considerable research 
burden for heterodox economists (and historians of economics) in terms 
of what they need to review to form judgments about the current state 
of economics. But people’s own research programs usually crowd this 
out. My guess, then, is that there are generational issues in training here. 
Scholars tomorrow, historians, and heterodox economists, will be simply 
better able to judge these questions about the state of economics 
because they will have grown up in the middle of these debates. 
 
Does this have implications for economic methodology? 
 
Very much so. The past history of economic methodology, with the 
critique of logical positivism, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, sociology of 
scientific knowledge, and so on, was very much a general philosophy    
of science approach applied to economics. Needless to say this was of 
little interest to practicing economists, and accordingly probably served 
to isolate and marginalize the field of methodology. Economic 
methodology now is quite different in its focus on the epistemological, 
ontological, and normative commitments underlying new research 
methods in economics (as reflected in what gets published in the 
Journal of Economic Methodology). So it is much closer to economic 
practice than it was before, but this also makes it hard to say what 
economic methodology is about, since there are so many threads and 
issues. As one example, agent-based modeling, as in Alan Kirman’s 
(2011) work, attempts to explain markets as somehow ‘self-organizing’ 
rather than being ordered in a traditional micro-foundational way.  
Thus, one methodological issue is what are the epistemic credentials of 
the concept of self-organization as compared to those of the traditional 
foundations idea? There are many new questions of this sort in recent 
economics. 
 
Within heterodox economics you have been particularly involved with 
‘social economics’ (e.g., as an editor of the Review of Social Economy 
and president of the Association for Social Economics). What is social 
economics? Is it a school of heterodox economics, like Marxian or 
post-Keynesian economics, or something more like a movement? 
 
Social economics is a school of heterodox economics, not only in light of 
the characterization of heterodox economics I give above, but also 
because of its rejection of the fact-value distinction embraced by 
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orthodox (and some heterodox) economists. For social economists, both 
our thinking and the economy are irreducibly value-laden. Sometimes 
we can reasonably put value associations aside, but many times we do 
so at our peril. In addition, social economics is pluralistic with respect 
to values in economics. Whereas mainstream economics is explicitly 
welfarist (and implicitly libertarian), social economics recognizes equity, 
justice, fairness, dignity, human rights, responsibility, and the like—the 
full gamut of human normative concerns—as involved in economic life. 
So social economists reject the view that there is a distinct economic 
domain of life in which other values are not involved, and argues that 
the mainstream view that the economic domain is separate and distinct 
is just a means of promoting one system of values at the expense of 
others. 
In addition, social economics is the economics of forms of social 
organization distinct from the market and state associated with the 
cooperative non-profit sector. This sector is in fact amazingly large and 
diverse, but remarkably it is little studied by economists, even hardly 
recognized, though it can be argued that both the market and state 
depend upon it in a variety of ways. In my view, the profession’s 
overlooking of the social economy is due to a long history of ideological 
debate over the relative merits of market and state. This may change 
with new currents in recent economics, since one of the main findings of 
experimental and behavioral research is that people often cooperate, 
and do so on account of how their local interaction is organized. 
One major ambition of the Association for Social Economics, then,  
is to convey its view that values matter in economics, and contest       
the fact-value distinction. Unfortunately there is not a lot of reason to be 
optimistic here, since the positivistic view that economics is a value-free 
science is very strong among economists and in society’s desired view of 
economics and science. On the other hand, since much current 
behavioral and experimental research is now devoted to investigating 
‘pro-social’ motives for behavior and coordination problems, 
mainstream economists may be moving toward allowing that the 
economy is not value-free even if they continue to believe that 
economics is value-free! 
 
You have mentioned the fact-value dichotomy several times. There 
seem to be three distinct ways of understanding the fact-value 
distinction in economics, though they are much entangled in practice 
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and in the rhetoric of heterodox economists: metaphysical, normative, 
and methodological. Firstly there is the metaphysical ‘dichotomy’ 
(which Hilary Putnam has criticized so effectively, e.g., Putnam 2002) 
associated with the now somewhat anachronistic philosophical 
position of positivism which claimed that facts and values were of 
quite different kinds and only empirical facts (and deductions) could 
count as knowledge. Secondly there is the normative proposition that 
economists should stick to empirical and formal analysis because the 
pursuit of objective truth, rather than ethical analysis, ideology, or 
activism, is what proper scientists do. Hence it is wrong (a failure      
of professional ethics) to insert one’s value judgments into one’s 
technical analysis. And thirdly there is the methodological position 
that values do not matter for economic life and therefore for 
economic analysis.  
My question is what do you think of the normative interpretation 
of the fact-value distinction? Are there not good reasons for 
economists to have a professional identity as scientists rather than   
as ideologues, moralists, or activists? For example in allowing easier 
communication and debate between economists, and making their 
policy claims and advice to governments and the public more 
trustworthy. 
 
I think there are two propositions operating in the normative 
interpretation you offer. First, there is the proposition that economists 
and scientists should not be ideologues, and should not inject their 
value judgments into their work. Second, there is the proposition that 
empirical and formal analysis are a domain of objective truth, where 
objectivity is a matter of being value-free. The second proposition is in 
my view a species of what Putnam rightfully complains about. When       
I argue that ordinary scientific discourse is value-laden, I reject both the 
idea that there is an objective domain of investigation that is fully value-
free and the idea that the value domain itself is not objective.  
The claim that the value domain is subjective derives from the 1930s 
logical positivist doctrine regarding values, namely, emotivism. That in 
turn draws on Hume’s old is-ought dichotomy, which many have argued 
is a false dichotomy in that there are many ‘is’ statements which 
smuggle in ‘ought’ statements (Myrdal 1953; Boumans and Davis 2010, 
173ff.). For example, it appears that statements using the concept of 
equilibrium are value-free, but it can also well be argued that explaining 
the market system in terms of some natural balance idea rather than    
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in terms of social conflict and power is ideological, thus value-laden.      
I do not say all economic ideas are significantly value-laden. But many of 
them, including some of the most fundamental, do imply or subscribe  
to various values about how we ought to see the world, even if the 
statements using them neither employ ought language nor point clearly 
to implied values.  
This puts the first of the two propositions I distinguished above in   
a different light. I agree that economists and scientists should not be 
ideologues, but I interpret behaving in this way as a matter of denying 
and concealing the values they hold under the banner of objectivity and 
the Humean dichotomy. Most economists, for example, are strongly pro-
individual freedom. Freedom is obviously an important value, but why 
pretend that an economics that makes it central (often in such a way as 
to exclude other values such as equity and justice) is not employing that 
value? So objective science for me is about being clear about your 
values. I regard policy-makers as trustworthy when I feel they are open 
about their value agenda. Again, to be clear, not everything in economics 
turns on values, so there is much empirical and formal analysis which 
can be engaged in by economists who have quite different values. 
Generally speaking, my view of objective science is a pluralist science in 
which different views over what we value interact with our investigation 
of the way the world works in a causal sense. 
 
You have become very interested in another heterodox school of 
economics that many will find surprising to be classified as economics 
at all: the capability approach. Firstly, could you explain why you    
see it as a school of economics, and second, what lies behind your 
particular interest in it?  
 
I find it paradoxical that so many economists see the capability 
approach as outside economics. That is due, I believe, to the hegemonic 
dominance of welfare theory in economics with its utilitarian individual 
basis. But in all other regards the capability approach is very standard.  
It is about resources, choice, economic growth, and well-being and 
freedom. Its dismissal by much of the profession thus demonstrates    
to me the unacknowledged power of welfarism, and utilitarianism 
generally, as philosophical assumptions. The capability approach has an 
entirely different view of what a person is—a deliberating, active being—
whereas mainstream economics operates with a nineteenth century 
mechanical psychology view.  
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Unlike many people I am fairly optimistic about the future for the 
capability approach. Its view of the person and human development 
resonates with what I believe people today generally think, that is,     
that people can develop their capabilities over their lifetimes. Given, 
however, that the economics profession is so locked in and path-
dependent in its commitment to the welfarist-utilitarian view, we should 
not expect it to significantly embrace the capabilities approach in the 
near future. Assuming, then, that the capability approach continues to 
be employed by other social scientists concerned with human 
development, it seems we should expect considerable schizophrenia     
in economic social policy deep into the 21st century. 
As for my own interest in the capability approach, as is clear from 
what I say above, it derives from my interest in the theory of the 
individual, which I regard as the central philosophical issue in 
economics. 
 
You are well known for your particular interest in what may seem   
an obscure issue in economic theory—personal identity. Could you 
explain why economists should take identity seriously? 
 
There are two reasons for my concern with individuals and their 
identity, one historical and one scientific. Historically, there is no 
obvious reason to think, from the record of humanity, that individual 
people count for anything in their constant slaughter and terrible abuse 
over thousands of years in the name of ‘higher’ causes. But despite    
this history people around the world seem to believe individuals are 
important (an important expression of which is the pervasive desire    
for democracy). I think this is a fundamental historical discovery about 
human life, made over the last several centuries, that today we often 
take for granted but which needs much more thought. It begins with 
asking what an individual is, or what personal identity consists in. 
Unless you are offering a religious answer to this question (which I am 
afraid may be one underlying basis for Homo economicus in the analogy 
between the doctrine of the human soul and an atomistic individual),     
I think one finds this one of the most difficult questions to answer.  
Scientifically speaking, on the other hand, what economics offers us 
regarding explaining the individual, despite its reputation as being the 
one social science that is about individuals, is not very helpful, since     
it assumes without scrutiny an essentially ideological view—that people 
are independent and untrammeled in their exercise of choice. While 
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economics has generally been good at examining the exogeneity-
endogeneity logic of economic processes, it has nonetheless failed to 
investigate the degree of endogeneity (or boundedness) of individuality 
itself. Nor does it even have plausible grounds for supposing that 
individuality is exogenous. The Homo economicus preferences 
conception of the individual, as I emphasize in my recent (2011) book,  
is circular, meaning that it assumes individuality—a person is defined as 
a collection of their own preferences—in order to say that the person 
thus understood is an individual.  
So if economists take a concern for individuals as a central historical 
value underlying their work—a normative individualism—and take that 
seriously, then their scientific work requires that they explain the nature 
and influence of individuality on the economy better than they do.     
For me, whether economists are able to do this will be a crucial test of 
the relevance of economics as a discipline in this century. 
 
Is it true that economics is about individuals rather than individual 
choice? Some might say (for example, Teschl 2011, 75) that in 
representing individuals as unique preference orderings economists 
are merely constructing an abstract model for use in studying 
rational choice, and do not intend that model to be taken seriously   
as an account of what people are. 
 
There are two problems with this view in my opinion. First, the 
formalist, anti-realist impulse it serves tells us that whether economics 
has any connection to the world is irrelevant. I do not believe people 
who advocate this view actually think this, so their problem seems to be 
that they have not thought out the whole range of issues associated with 
explaining how economics connects to the world. Second, if a formal 
model of choice can be applied to any and every candidate agent (single 
person, group of people, part of a person, animal, machine, and so on), 
why should we believe it applies to any in particular? That is, the formal 
model of choice is essentially indiscriminate and so is in no position to 
make any ontological claims. 
 
You brought out a well-received book on how orthodox and heterodox 
economics conceive of the identity of economic agents in 2003.      
Last year you published a new book that seemed to go much further 
in proposing how mainstream economics should think about identity. 
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Could you outline how you now think about identity in economics, and 
what economists should do about it? 
 
The 2003 book, The theory of the individual in economics, contrasted the 
standard un-embedded Homo economicus individual with individuals 
seen as socially embedded to examine whether a person could be both 
socially embedded and individual. Traditionally, heterodox economics 
was about groups and not individuals, and neoclassical economics about 
individuals and not groups. I thought this was a false dichotomy: 
neoclassical economics does not succeed in showing that an atomistic 
being is an individual and heterodox economics actually has grounds for 
saying that people have a sort of individual autonomy, albeit one that 
depends on their relations to others. 
What drove the argument were two ontological criteria of identity 
(individuation and reidentification through change), implied by the 
concept of an individual, which I used to evaluate different conceptions 
of the individual. Failing those criteria means that one does not have a 
conception of the individual that can be said to refer to real world 
individuals. I argued that Homo economicus fails both criteria and that 
most heterodox conceptions can satisfy the individuation criterion     
but not the reidentification criterion. The latter matter has not been 
adequately worked out by heterodox economists, in my view. But the 
2003 book only evaluated neoclassical mainstream economics.             
So the 2011 book, Individuals and identity in economics, evaluates       
the conceptions of the individual in the new research programs in 
economics (behavioral, experimental, game theory, evolutionary, and so 
forth). It also tries to go further than the previous book to set out          
a capabilities conception of the individual that satisfies both criteria, 
and thus tells us what personal identity consists in (at least in 
economics). The argument of the book progressively assembles what 
this involves. It starts by emphasizing, through critique of behavioral 
economics and game theory views of the individual, how individuality 
depends on relations to others. It then puts this into evolutionary terms 
with a role for learning. Here I draw on Herbert Simon and the idea       
of self-organization (Simon 1955; 1956). Finally, it frames this relational-
evolutionary conception in terms of capabilities (for a capabilities 
conception of the person); includes social identities among a person’s 
capabilities; and then defines personal identity as a special capability 
one may (or may not) develop for maintaining a changing narrative one 
keeps of oneself with the help of others.  
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Given the philosophical character of the book, my ambition for it is 
modest. At the very least I hope that the issue of what individuality 
involves becomes an issue in economics, and that economists recognize 
that taking individuality as exogenous is unscientific and not in keeping 
with their standard method of asking what happens when something 
previously thought exogenous is re-conceived as having determinants 
within one’s analysis. One way I think this might begin to come about   
is through an examination of the social identity-personal identity 
connection. People’s social identities change over their lifetimes, and 
change who they are. So choices people make in this regard reverberate 
back upon their future choices, showing endogeneity in individuality. 
 
I discovered in reading your CV that you have been involved in       
the nominations process for the Economics Nobel Prize. That sounds 
tremendously exciting. Could you say something about why you were 
selected, what it involved, and what new insights or perspectives this 
gave you on the prize? 
 
I became a nominator when I began at the University of Amsterdam      
in 2002. I don’t know why I was selected—though I assume it had to    
do with the long standing European respect for the University of 
Amsterdam in the history of economic thought and economic 
methodology, going back to the original chair of Johannes Klant, and 
through Mary Morgan and Mark Blaug. I am not involved in later rounds 
of vetting individual candidates, which plays an important role in the 
determination of the Prize. But I was struck from the beginning by      
the nature of the nomination itself: one is asked to give a one sentence 
statement of the “discoveries, inventions, and improvements” of the 
nominee(s), and then add a longer statement explaining this.  
As an historian of economics and methodologist, an emphasis on 
originality seems to me naïve for a number of reasons. In any event,    
for many years I nominated Mark Blaug, arguing that he had ‘created’ 
the field of economic methodology (though of course there was 
methodological reasoning long before Blaug), which I took to be an 
invention and improvement for economics par excellence. Of course  
this is likely not quite what the Nobel committee means by “discoveries, 
inventions, and improvements”, and had Mark received the prize (which 
I genuinely believed he deserved), I and everyone else would have     
been astounded, given the general disrespect for history of economics 
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and methodology in the profession. Nonetheless I thought the case 
should be made both for Mark and for the history of economics.  
 
As well as a substantial publication record, you have served in a 
number of institutions (journal editorships and associations) 
associated with your research interests. What is your view of the 
health of the institutions of philosophy and economics? Do they 
benefit or lose from their inter-disciplinary orientation? 
 
I think the trend in general is clear regarding interdisciplinarity in 
economics and science: there will be more of it. The natural sciences are 
significantly ahead of the social sciences in this regard, but people who 
think institutionally about the long term strategies for the development 
of knowledge and science in foundations, universities, and government 
fully recognize this trend and generally support it. One might say that 
well established disciplines tend to exhibit diminishing returns to doing 
the same thing, and that the real gains are from going beyond 
identifiable disciplines. The good news in my view on this score is that 
all the new research programs in economics have important origins in 
other sciences. So the door is more open than it has been. 
As for philosophy and economics in particular, it seems that there  
is considerable philosophical reasoning throughout science, though it is 
not always framed in terms of the issues and debates in philosophy 
itself. So increased interdisciplinarity could raise the profile of 
philosophy in economics. Perhaps it might be argued that in a world     
in which interdisciplinarity increases, philosophical thinking gains in 
importance as a broadly shared conceptual apparatus. I think this is a 
partial explanation for the rise and professionalization of methodology 
and philosophy of economics in the last several decades, and so I am 
optimistic on this score about economics and philosophy as a distinct 
domain of research. We now have well established journals in the field 
that have created space within which research can be done. That the 
Erasmus Journal of Philosophy and Economics has so quickly become 
successful (!) seems a reflection of this.  
 
How has your own interdisciplinary work been received by the 
mainstream economics profession and the economics departments    
in which you work? 
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I have been fortunate at Marquette University where my colleagues have 
supported my research, though my department does mainly empirical 
research. It helps that I am genuinely interested in economics, represent 
myself as an economist, and am interested in my colleagues’ empirical 
research and modeling intuitions as an instruction in economists’ 
practice. I regularly tell myself I have been missing something when       
a colleague explains what he or she is trying to do in some piece of 
research. It is also worth saying that the Catholic mission of Marquette 
has made my type of research with its emphasis on social values and the 
dignity of the individual more acceptable than it might have been in a 
state-supported university. In fact I was hired at Marquette to replace    
a long-time member of the department, Peter Danner, who taught 
economics and ethics, as I continue to do. Finally, I am in a college of 
business, which means I work in an environment of different business 
fields, which might be argued to provide a more pluralistic environment. 
For most of my time over ten years at the University of Amsterdam 
my research and that of my colleagues was strongly supported. (I taught 
three courses every second fall term, and took leave from Marquette.) 
Unfortunately over the last two years people in leadership positions 
there at the faculty of economics decided that the history and 
methodology of economics (HME) was not important, and in conditions 
of a financial emergency associated with chronic budget shortfalls 
closed down the HME group. That included sacking my very 
accomplished and, in our field, well-respected colleagues Marcel 
Boumans and Harro Maas, who had been associate professors there    
for many years, and ending the chair position in HME, which I held, 
which had been at the faculty for decades. We had six courses in         
the history and methodology of economics; engaged and enthusiastic 
students; a research group of up to a dozen people; a master degree     
in HME; PhD students; and a required methodology course for bachelor 
students. I do not think there was a better program in the world in     
our field. We also had great interaction with the London School of 
Economics, the history of economics people at Duke University, history 
of economics people in Paris, and the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy 
and Economics. The HME group was internationally recognized, and 
attracted students from across the world. Our financial footprint, in 
fact, was quite small compared to other groups, and by a number         
of measures of output per person we were more productive than many 
other research groups at Amsterdam. 
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Since I fully believe the faculty financial emergency could have been 
addressed without eliminating the group, I can only put what happened 
down to prejudice against our field, plus the usual on-going territorial 
aggrandizing that has been a key factor in the elimination of history     
of economics from most American universities. It is interesting to me 
also, that with a few exceptions, members of the economics faculty at 
Amsterdam made no effort on the HME group’s behalf to resist what 
happened or even personally expressed regret or concern to those who 
lost their jobs. I find this reprehensible. 
The loss of this program was a blow to our field. There are now    
few places in the world training PhD students in history and/or 
methodology of economics. So in the final analysis the situation for 
economics and philosophy is mixed: considerable achievement with     
an uncertain future. Great weight, in my view, should be placed on 
restoring PhD training in the field, something that is being done, for 
instance, through generous grants from the Institute for New Economic 
Thinking at Duke University under Bruce Caldwell.  
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